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 ABSTRACT 
This project is an evaluation of a new, more proactive approach to legionellosis 
investigations conducted by the Southern Nevada Health District.  The new protocol was 
conceived, written and adopted in April of 2012 with the goal of preventing outbreaks of 
Legionnaires’ disease that can have a significant impact on public health and the resort 
industry of Las Vegas.  The objectives of this project were to determine if the 
remediation methods were successful at eliminating the target organism from water 
systems and maintaining a negative status throughout the monitoring period, to 
conduct a cost/benefit analysis, and to compare this protocol with other proactive 
health department protocols.   
Ninety percent of facilities found to be sources were able to obtain and maintain 
a negative target organism status throughout the monitoring period, indicating that the 
remediation methods are effective.  There was no significant difference between the 
remediation methods (hot water flush, chlorine flush or both) in obtaining and 
maintaining negative results for Legionella.  This evaluation also found that average 
yearly costs for SNHD increased from about $5,611 a year on legionellosis investigations 
to about $82,675.  An estimate of the cost to all facilities investigated since 
implementation is $1,466,000 with an approximate total cost to SNHD and facilities of 
$1,590,013.  This is a minor investment when compared with the significant healthcare 
costs of legionellosis illness and outbreaks in the U.S., which total $101-321 million per 
year.  In addition, litigation awards can cost facilities hundreds of millions of dollars.  No 
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other health departments were identified that conduct this type of proactive 
investigation, and often only initiate an environmental investigation after a second case 
is found with an association to the same facility as a previous case.  Often, by then it is 
too late to prevent outbreaks and additional illnesses associated with that facility.  This 
evaluation shows that the new protocol is potentially a strong public health prevention 
tool for legionellosis outbreaks, that it is cost effective, and would be an excellent 
template for other local health agencies to adopt in order to better protect the health of 
the public.     
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
Legionella pneumophila serogroup 1 is a bacterium that causes serious illness in 
thousands of people every year across the country, and in some cases it can be fatal.  
Illness caused by Legionella spp. is known as legionellosis and there are two distinct 
types of syndromes associated with this bacterium.  The less severe form of the illness is 
known as Pontiac fever and the more severe form that causes pneumonia is known as 
Legionnaires ’ disease.  The CDC estimates that between 8,000 and 18,000 people are 
hospitalized with Legionnaires’ disease each year in the U.S. (CDC, 2013).  In Clark 
County, it has been associated with seven outbreaks at major hotels on the Las Vegas 
strip between 2000 and 2012.  Over the last four years, the Southern Nevada Health 
District (SNHD) has averaged 20.5 case investigations per year, with the 2013 case 
investigation count at 25 through October.       
In an effort to provide a more proactive, preventative approach to Legionella 
investigations, SNHD completely revamped the Epidemiology and Environmental Health 
investigation protocols in April of 2012.  Previously, standard procedure only dictated an 
environmental investigation after a second case was identified as being associated with 
the same facility.  SNHD determined this was an inadequate response, as it allowed 
outbreaks to occur that could have been prevented had an environmental investigation 
been done after the first case association was found.  The objective of this study is to 
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evaluate the effectiveness of a more proactive approach to legionellosis investigations 
by SNHD.  Not only do improved investigation and remediation efforts protect the 
public’s health, but they also protect the image and tourist perception of the Las Vegas 
strip as a fun and safe destination for visitors. 
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CHAPTER 2 
REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE 
Discovery 
 Legionella bacteria were first discovered during an outbreak of severe 
pneumonia after an American Legion conference in Philadelphia in 1976 (Fraser, 1977).    
There were a total of 221 cases with 34 deaths, and two-thirds of the ill were 
hospitalized (Altman, 2006).  A new bacterium was identified as the cause, and named 
Legionella pneumophila.  The investigation led to discoveries regarding this bacterium.  
For example, it did not seem to spread from person to person, and people who had 
long-term exposures (hotel staff), seemed to be immune to it (Fraser, 1977).  The CDC 
scientist who first identified the organism, Dr. Joseph McDade, went on to discover that 
this was not the first time this bacterium had caused illness or outbreaks (Altman, 2006).  
He found that the earliest verified case was from 1947 and the earliest verified outbreak 
was in 1957.   Tissue samples from those two incidents had been saved by researchers, 
allowing L. pneumophila bacterium to be positively identified as the cause (Altman, 
2006).   
Today, the bacterial genus Legionella has at least 48 different species that have 
been identified, with 70 distinct serogroups (Heymann, 2008).  Only a few of these 
species have been associated with illness; the rest are either environmental 
microorganisms or their capability to cause illness is unknown (Kwait, 1998).  The 
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species primarily responsible for illness is Legionella pneumophila, which causes 90% of 
Legionnaires’ disease cases (Newton, 2010).  Within the species L. pneumophila, there 
are 18 different serogroups, with serogroup 1 being responsible for 95% of illness 
(Heymann, 2008; Kwait, 1998).  The environmental distribution for L. pneumophila 
serogroup 1 shows a different pattern than the prevalence in clinical samples.  
According to a large study done in France, L. pneumophila serogroup 1 comprises 95% of 
all clinical isolates but only 28% of environmental isolates (Doleans, 2004).  One of the 
most common diagnostic tests performed on suspected patients is a urine antigen test 
that is specific for L. pneumophila serogroup 1, so the true clinical impact of other L. 
pneumophila serogroups is unknown.  
Reservoir 
 Legionella bacteria are ubiquitous in the environment worldwide and are mostly 
found in water sources, such as lakes, rivers, and reservoirs.  From these natural 
environments, the bacteria can migrate into a man-made environment, such as a 
building or a city water system (Hornei, 2007).   The bacteria grow best in a warm 
environment with temperature ranges between 77 and 108 degrees Fahrenheit.  
Legionella will not survive in temperatures above 140°F and will fall into a dormant state 
and not multiply in temperatures below 68°F (ECDC, 2012).  However, once the 
temperature rises into its ideal zone, it can return from dormancy to an active, 
multiplying state.  An interesting aspect to Legionella bacteria is that they are parasitic 
and, in order to complete their life cycle, invade free-living soil and freshwater amoebas 
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(Newton, 2010).  This relationship allows the bacteria to replicate and provides 
protection from harsh environments.  Other favorable conditions for Legionella growth 
are the presence of sludge, sediment, rust, and biofilms, which are conducive to a 
healthy protozoa population (Murga, 2001).  These conditions are commonly found in 
building water systems, particularly older buildings.   Common areas in buildings that 
can harbor the bacteria are cooling towers, spas, whirlpools, misting systems, fountains, 
and showers.  Each of these environments provides a mechanism for a susceptible 
person to inhale mist or water vapor containing the bacteria.  Inhalation of this vapor or 
mist could deposit bacteria into the lungs and lead to illness.   
Route of transmission 
 The route of transmission for Legionella bacteria is inhalation of aerosolized 
water droplets.  Water is aerosolized by spraying or splashing, or by bubbling air into it.  
The smaller the bacteria containing droplet, the more likely it is to cause infection 
(ECDC, 2012).  Drinking or swallowing the water will not cause illness; the bacteria must 
be introduced into the lungs for illness to occur.   Legionellosis has never been 
documented with human-to-human transmission (Newton, 2010).   
The illness 
Legionnaires’ disease is an illness that causes pneumonia and can be fatal for 10-
15% of cases (ECDC, 2012).  The disease usually begins with symptoms similar to 
influenza, which then progress to cough, difficulty breathing, and pneumonia.  Other 
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common symptoms include diarrhea and altered mental status (Hornei, 2007).  If 
appropriate antibiotics aren’t administered quickly enough, the illness can rapidly 
progress to respiratory failure, multi-organ system failure, shock, and death.  The 
incubation period is usually between 2 and 14 days, with an average of 7-10 days.  The 
bacteria can also cause a form of the disease that does not involve pneumonia, called 
Pontiac fever.  The incubation period for Pontiac fever is much shorter, 12 to 48 hours, 
and the illness is very similar to influenza.   Treatment is rarely necessary and many 
cases go undiagnosed because the ill person either doesn’t see a physician, or if they do 
seek care, the physician rarely orders Legionella testing for a mild illness.  Pontiac fever 
cases are usually only detected in outbreak situations when there is one common 
source exposure identified.  Many more people get Pontiac fever than Legionnaires’ 
disease, but Legionnaires’ is confirmed more often simply because the illness is so 
severe they are more likely to seek treatment and be tested.   Those who get the severe 
form of illness usually have other co-morbidities that weaken their immune systems or 
are over 50 and are less able to resist infection (CDC, 2013).   
 The only way to diagnose pneumonia caused by Legionella is to order testing 
specific for Legionella.  There are no clinical features that clearly distinguish 
Legionnaires’ disease from other pneumonia illnesses and Legionella will not grow on a 
typical, nonspecific bacterial culture.  Since the late 1990’s, the use of the urine antigen 
test for confirming Legionnaires’ disease has led to rapid diagnosis and increased 
reporting due to the speed and inexpensive nature of the test (ECDC, 2012).  As 
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mentioned, the drawbacks are that this test only detects the most common serogroup, 
and if there is no culture analysis performed, then no environmental isolates can be 
obtained for comparison to determine the exact source of exposure.     
Legionellosis trends 
Over the last 10 years, there has been a threefold increase in legionellosis cases 
reported throughout the United States (Berkelman, 2008).  In 2002, there were 1,310 
cases reported and in 2009 there were 3,522 cases.  This increase can be seen across all 
age groups and geographic regions (CDC, 2011).  The increase can be attributed to 
several factors, including population changes, improved diagnostic testing, and 
enhanced national surveillance (CDC, 2013).  Some of the population factors are the 
increase of the “built environment”, increase in travel and increase in aging and immune 
compromised people (Berkelman, 2008).  In our man-made environment, we are 
constructing more buildings and they are becoming taller, which necessitates a more 
extensive water supply system that increases the chances of colonization by Legionella. 
People travel more and many cases of Legionnaires’ disease are associated with stays in 
hotels, because these are often large, tall buildings that the bacteria can readily colonize 
(CDC, 2013).  A susceptible host is required for successful transmission from the 
environment to a human.  A person who’s immune system is weakened either by age or 
a health condition is much more likely to become seriously ill than a younger, healthy 
adult.   
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The advent and use of the urine antigen test has improved diagnostic capability 
and become widely available, assisting health care providers in rapid, cost-effective, 
appropriate diagnoses.  In Nevada, and every other state in the U.S., when a health care 
provider diagnoses Legionnaires’ disease, the provider is required by law to report the 
case to the local health department (State of Nevada, 2012).  The local health 
department then has to investigate the case, identify any potential risk factors, and 
report the details to their state health department. The state then reports the case to 
the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC).  If it is discovered that the case 
had traveled during the two weeks prior to onset of symptoms, the CDC reports the case 
to the state health department(s) of the state(s) that the case visited.  The national 
surveillance system relies on all states reporting cases of legionellosis to the CDC and 
the CDC providing information back to states about cases that had traveled to other 
states during the weeks before they became ill.   
Legionellosis in Clark County 
The Southern Nevada Health District (SNHD) is the local health authority for 
Clark County.  SNHD is responsible for a variety of public health programs related to the 
safety and health of the community, including the investigation of all cases of 
legionellosis.  Between 2000 and 2012, SNHD investigated seven major outbreaks 
related to large hotels on the Las Vegas strip.  Two of the outbreaks occurred within a 
year of each other, between 2011 and 2012.  After the second major outbreak in less 
than 12 months, legionellosis outbreak data were compiled and analyzed and it was 
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found that SNHD was deficient in preventing outbreaks and protecting the public when 
it came to Legionella.  Prior to April of 2012, the Legionella investigation protocol 
dictated environmental investigation and intervention only after a second case was 
identified with an association to the same facility as a case in the previous year.  After 
analyzing the outbreak data, it was found that, in every outbreak scenario, there was 
one seemingly sporadic case, shortly followed by several other cases (SNHD Figure 1, 2, 
3 and 4).  SNHD theorized that if an environmental investigation was initiated after the 
first case, then future cases and outbreaks could be avoided in association with that 
facility.  A new standard operating procedure was developed between the offices of 
Epidemiology and Environmental Health with a new protocol for investigation of 
legionellosis cases.  The purpose of this new protocol was to emphasize the prevention 
of future cases and outbreaks (See Appendix 1 for the new Epidemiology protocol and 
Appendix 2 for the new Environmental Health protocol).   Where the old protocol only 
dictated an environmental investigation after a second case was found to be associated 
with a facility, the new protocol dictates an environmental investigation with any 
exposure to a public location.  The new protocol also requires facilities that are found to 
be positive for the target organism (the organism that caused illness in the case, usually 
L. pneumophila serogroup 1) to undergo remediation until they are negative for the 
target organism and then complete a 14-month monitoring period.  If at any point 
during the monitoring period, the facility becomes re-colonized and tests positive, they 
must go through another remediation process and start the monitoring period over. 
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Figure 1.  Epidemiologic curve, facility 1 legionellosis cases 2009-2011 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Epidemiologic curve, facility 2 legionellosis cases 2011 
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Figure 3. Epidemiologic curve, facility 3 legionellosis cases, 2006-2008 
 
 
Figure 4. Epidemiologic curve, facility 4 legionellosis cases, 2001-2012 
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Clark County has also demonstrated the trend of increasing legionellosis cases.  The 
table below illustrates the rates of legionellosis infections in Clark County from 2000-
2009 (Figure 5).  It is important to keep in mind that these rates are strictly for Clark 
County residents, yet often, half of the investigations SNHD conducts are in people who 
reside outside of Clark County who visited a hotel in Las Vegas during their incubation 
period (Figure 6).   
 
 
 
Figure 5. Legionellosis, annual rates in Clark County, 2000-2009 
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Figure 6. Legionellosis case investigations 2008-2013 
 
Legionellosis case investigations 
 The starting point of any investigation is the report of disease, either by a 
laboratory or the diagnosing physician.  When the Office of Epidemiology receives a 
report of legionellosis, the case is assigned to an investigator and that investigator 
attempts to interview the person.  During the interview, the case is asked about 
potential risk factors, such as travel, staying overnight anywhere other than their usual 
residence, pool/Jacuzzi exposure, water fountain exposure, etc.  If there are any local 
exposures identified that could expose other members of the public, an environmental 
investigation is initiated.  If a risk factor is identified outside of Clark County, Nevada 
State Health Division is notified, they pass the information to the CDC and the CDC 
informs the state where the exposure may have occurred.   
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Environmental investigation 
If a local public location is identified as a risk factor, then an environmental 
investigation is conducted.  Most of the time the location is a hotel, but any location 
that could be considered a hazard to the public would be investigated.  Examples of past 
investigations include public pools/jacuzzis, apartment complexes, and the misting 
system of a horse ranch.  During the initial phase of the environmental investigation, a 
team from SNHD meets with management, risk management, and maintenance staff of 
the affected property.  Water system protocols are reviewed, recent test results are 
reviewed if the property conducts any routine testing, and building schematics are 
assessed.  A tour of the property commences to identify locations onsite that could 
expose a person to Legionella bacteria.  Water samples are collected from all fixtures in 
the room where the case stayed as well as the distal room (the farthest room from the 
water heater on the same hot water pipe as the case’s room).  All other bodies of water 
from the property are sampled as well.  In addition to the water collection for Legionella 
testing, temperature and chlorine measurements are taken with each sample.  Samples 
are sent to a private laboratory to test for Legionella.  The results are usually received 
back at SNHD within 10-14 days.  SNHD informs the facility of the results, and if the 
target organism is identified (the organism that caused the illness in the case, usually L. 
pneumophila serogroup 1), then remediation is required.   
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Remediation 
Remediation is based on standards set by the 2012 ASHRAE (American Society of 
Heating, Refrigerating and Air Conditioning Engineers) guidelines (ASHRAE, 2011).  They 
recommend two methods for eliminating Legionella from a water system – hot water 
flush and/or chlorine flush.  SNHD offers facilities three options for remediation – hot 
water flush, chlorine flush or both.  To accomplish the hot water flush, the temperature 
at every fixture in the affected area must reach between 160-170 degrees Fahrenheit.  
For a successful chlorination, the facility must maintain a chlorine level of at least 2 ppm 
for a minimum contact time of 2 hours.  Every fixture on the line is checked to make 
sure that level is maintained throughout the entire system.   Remediation can cause 
significant logistical difficulties for a facility because entire building areas must be 
unoccupied in order to safely and efficiently conduct the remediation procedures and 
testing.  Once remediation is complete, the sites are sampled again for the target 
organism.  If the target organism is detected, the facility must complete another round 
of remediation until the target organism is no longer detected.   
Monitoring 
Once a facility has been deemed successfully remediated, the facility moves into 
the monitoring phase of the protocol.  Monitoring lasts a total of 14 months, consists of 
9 rounds of water sampling and is divided into three phases.  If the target organism is 
identified during monitoring, the facility must start over with remediation and 
monitoring from the first phase.  The first phase of monitoring is the collection of bi-
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weekly samples.  The facility must have 3 consecutive bi-weekly negative samples to 
move on to the second phase.  To pass the second phase, they must show 3 consecutive 
monthly negative samples before moving on to the final phase of monitoring, which are 
quarterly samples.  Once the facility has provided 3 consecutive quarterly samples, 
negative for the target organism, they are deemed non-hazardous and are no longer 
monitored by SNHD.  The facility is encouraged to maintain a water-monitoring plan to 
prevent any future problems because re-colonization can occur at any time.   
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CHAPTER 3 
PROJECT PROPOSAL 
Objective 
This study evaluated the effectiveness of a more proactive approach to 
legionellosis investigations conducted by SNHD to determine if this approach is 
conducive to detecting and eliminating ongoing sources of Legionella before an 
outbreak occurs.  It also determined whether the extensive resources necessary to 
implement the more proactive investigation and intervention are justified.  One of the 
primary differences between the old protocol and the new one, that makes the 
approach more proactive, is the fact that the new protocol dictates an environmental 
investigation after only one case association is found with a public location.  Another 
difference between the protocols is the fact that the new protocol provides strict 
guidelines and timelines for facilities to follow through a remediation and monitoring 
process if they are found to be sources of the target organism.    
The objectives of this study were to: 
(1) Compare remediation methods to determine which, if any, are more 
effective at eliminating the target organism and maintaining baseline 
negative status. 
(2) Conduct a cost benefit analysis to determine if the public health benefits of 
the new protocol (conducting environmental investigations after one case 
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association vs. waiting until a second case is identified) justify the cost of the 
intervention on SNHD’s part and the part of the affected facility. 
(3) Compare SNHD’s data with those obtained by other health department 
protocols to determine if the more proactive approach is effective at 
reducing or eliminating clusters and outbreaks.   
Research Questions 
(1) Are the remediation procedures (hot water flush, chlorine flush or both) 
implemented at facilities found to be contaminated with L. pneumophila 
serogroup 1 effective at preventing future contamination associated with 
that facility?  
(2)  Are the costs associated with implementation of the new protocol justified 
by the health benefits achieved? 
(3) Is the new protocol comparable in cost and effectiveness to those used by 
other health departments? 
Hypothesis 
The goal of this study was to determine which of the remediation methods is 
most effective at eliminating the target organism and maintaining a negative baseline 
status throughout the 14-month monitoring period.   
Ho:  There is no difference between the remediation options - hot water flush 
only, chlorine flush only and both methods in obtaining and maintaining negative 
results for L. pneumophila contamination.   
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HA:  There is a difference between the remediation options - hot water flush 
only, chlorine flush only and both methods in obtaining and maintaining negative 
results for L. pneumophila contamination. 
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CHAPTER 4 
PROJECT APPROACH 
Methods 
Objective 1: Comparison of remediation processes 
All facilities that underwent an environmental investigation were reviewed for 
initial sampling results.  Those facilities that were found to be positive with the target 
organism were identified as participants for the study.  A facility can choose one of 
three options to complete the remediation process – hot water flush, chlorine flush or 
both.  Ten facilities that were found to be sources began the remediation and 
monitoring process.  Of the 10, 6 (60%) chose to utilize both methods of remediation, 1 
(10%) chose the hot water flush and 3 (30%) chose the chlorine flush.   
All results of post remediation and monitoring samples of these facilities were 
reviewed and a data table was compiled (Table 1).  There were two possible results 
identified: negative – target organism not detected or positive – target organism 
detected.  The only results that required action were the detection of the target 
organism at concentrations ≥ 10cfu/ml or if the target organism was present in more 
than one fixture at any concentration.   
The repeated survival method was used to compare the water sampling results 
obtained with the three different remediation methods.  The repeated survival method 
is useful for analyzing the time to the occurrence of an event (Cleves, 2008).  In this 
case, the “event” would be a positive target organism result and the “time” is the 
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number of weeks from the remediation date to the date of a positive result.  This will 
help identify any differences between remediation methods for each test event and 
which methods yielded the best outcomes.  The data should have 10 test events per 
facility, the initial post remediation results, plus the nine monitoring samples.   Not all 
facilities have completed the monitoring period so the data set is incomplete, but all 
completed sampling results were used for analysis.    
 
Objective 2: Cost benefit analyses 
 The new protocol was designed to be a more proactive approach to legionellosis 
investigations.  Based on the new protocol, more environmental investigations are 
conducted and they are much more intensive than previous investigations.  One of the 
objectives of this study was to determine if the additional cost to SNHD and the affected 
facilities is cost effective.   
 To evaluate the cost effectiveness for of the new protocol for SNHD, several key 
sets of data were compiled including staff time and laboratory costs for the initial 
sample analysis results.  This information was averaged based on facility size (small vs. 
large) and combined for each environmental investigation to determine a total cost for 
the new protocol to SNHD.  For the cost to facilities, a range of prices for laboratory 
testing, remediation methods, and other additional measures that facilities chose to 
utilize were compiled with smaller facilities assigned the low end of the cost range and 
larger facilities the higher end.    The estimated total costs for SNHD and affected 
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facilities were added for comparison to the estimated healthcare costs for patients 
diagnosed with Legionnaires’ disease.  Potential litigation costs were researched and 
noted as well.  Sources were found that estimated the cost of Legionnaires’ disease 
including hospitalizations, outbreaks, and the cost annually in the U.S.  Past Clark County 
outbreak information was reviewed to determine the potential cost savings had those 
outbreaks been prevented.  
  
Objective 3: Comparison with other health departments 
 Consultation was conducted with the CDC’s Legionellosis Surveillance & 
Outbreak Response Coordinator, the Regional Manager for Phigenics, a national water 
management company that services all southwestern U.S. states and other large local 
health departments from New York, New Jersey, and Florida.    
Participants 
 The target populations of this study were facilities that were found to be sources 
of the target organism, Legionella pneumophila serogroup 1.  If a facility was found to 
be a source of the target organism during the environmental investigation, they were 
part of the sample group and the results from their remediation and monitoring process 
were compared with all other facilities that were found to be sources as well.   
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Measurement 
 SNHD follows OSHA guidelines for Legionella control to determine which 
facilities would be considered sources and deemed a public health hazard.  This gives 
SNHD the authority to require remediation and monitoring.  CFU, or colony forming 
units, is a common measurement for bacterial enumeration and provides a range for the 
acceptable number of bacteria in water supplies.  OSHA requires that the bacteria be 
measured at ≤10 cfu/ml in domestic water supplies, ≤1 cfu/ml for misting systems, and 
≤100 cfu/ml for cooling towers (OSHA, 1999).  
Variables 
In this study there are three independent variables related to the remediation 
methods chosen by facilities – hot water flush, chlorine flush, and both methods 
combined.  The dependent variables are the sampling results when testing the water.   
Depending on the laboratory, results were either reported as non-detected or negative, 
detected but not the target organism, target organism detected but at non-hazardous 
levels, or target organism detected.  Only detection of the target organism, L. 
pneumophila serogroup 1, at levels above the OSHA guidelines will result in a positive 
sample and a restart of the remediation and monitoring process.  There are also some 
confounding variables that could have an effect on the dependent variable, for example, 
age of the facility, size of the facility, occupation rates of the facility and the monetary 
resources of the facility owners.  Each of these could have an impact on a facility’s 
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ability to obtain and maintain a negative baseline status, independent of which 
remediation method a facility chose.  
Results 
 Objective 1: Comparison of remediation methods  
 Due to the various limitations mentioned, the results from the statistical analysis 
were not statistically significant.  Using the repeated survival analysis, the P values were 
large (>0.05), indicating that we are unable to reject the null hypothesis - there is no 
difference between remediation methods.  The comparison between the hot water 
flush and both methods together yielded a p-value of 0.378 and between the chlorine 
flush and both methods together had a p-value of 0.235.  The one facility (Facility B) that 
was unable to maintain a negative status used the chlorine only method and completed 
four different remediation procedures.  After four remediation procedures, the water 
system remained colonized, so the facility closed the entire building indefinitely and is 
currently working with consultants to develop a new remediation strategy.  
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Table 1. Comparison of remediation methods   
 
Remedia
tion 
Method 
Facil
ity 
Remedia
tion Date 
Monitoring Results 
IPRR 
1st 
BW 
2nd 
BW 
3rd 
BW 1st M 2nd M 3rd M 1st Q 2nd Q 
3rd 
Q 
HW A 
7/17/201
2 NEG NEG NEG NEG  NEG NEG NEG NEG  MNC   
CL B 
8/30/12 NEG NEG POS 
   
    
11/27/12 
 
NEG POS 
   
2/20/13 
 
NEG POS 
   
5/6/13 
 
NEG NEG NEG POS CLSD 
 
C 
6/10/201
3 NEG               NEG NEG NEG NEG PEND         
 
D 
9/11/201
3 NEG NEG PEND               
BOTH E 
5/9/13 NEG NEG POS 
 
      
6/28/13 
 
NEG NEG PEND 
 
F 
6/14/201
2 NEG               MNC                 
  G 
5/22/201
3 NEG               NEG NEG  MNC             
  H 9/9/2013 NEG               PEND                 
  I 
7/11/201
1 NEG               NEG NEG NEG NEG NEG NEG NEG NEG 
NE
G 
  J 
1/27/201
2 NEG               NEG NEG NEG  MNC           
 
Key – HW = Hot water flush 
 CL = Chlorine flush  
 BOTH = Hot water & chlorine flush 
IPRR = Initial post remediation results  
BW = Bi-weekly 
M = Monthly 
Q = Quarterly 
 POS = Positive for target organism 
 NEG = Target organism not detected 
 PEND = Sample results pending 
MNC = Monitoring not completed 
CLSD = Investigation closed 
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Objective 2: Cost Benefit Analysis 
For SNHD, the two biggest costs are staff time and laboratory fees.  The initial 
environmental assessment and sampling is paid for by SNHD.  All additional laboratory 
costs are the responsibility of the facility.  The amount of staff time required varies 
widely based on the size of the facility (Table 2).  According to SNHD’s Environmental 
Health Division Permit and Plan Review Fee Schedule, the “Per Man Hour” cost of an 
Environmental Health Specialist is $118 (SNHD, 2012).   For smaller facilities, it takes an 
average of 13 staff hours per facility, so the average cost to SNHD is $1,534 per small 
facility.  For large facilities, it takes an average of 57.8 staff hours per facility and costs 
on average $6,819 per facility.     
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Table 2. SNHD staff time summary (facility investigations July 2011 - October 2013) 
 
Facility 
Facility 
Size 
S-small 
L-large 
SNHD 
Staff 
Time 
hours 
Investigation 
Status  
 C-Complete 
O-Ongoing 
 
A S 9.3 C 
 
B L 23.3 O 
 
C L 45.25 O 
 
D L 78.75 O 
 
E L 22 C 
 
F L 19.5 C 
 
G S 37.8 O 
 
H L 68.6 C 
 
I L 24.2 O 
 
J L 15.75 C 
 
K L 226.25 C 
 
L L 10.5 C 
 
M L 52.75 C 
 
N L 150.1 C 
 
O S 2 C 
 
P S 23.8 O 
 
Q L 14.25 C 
 
R S 3 C 
 
S S 2 C 
Totals 19 
S=6, 
L=13 874.35 C=13,O=6 
 
 
The laboratory cost to SNHD ranges from $1,500 to $2,800 depending on how 
many samples are being tested.  Therefore, SNHD’s approximate total costs (staff time + 
laboratory fees) associated with legionellosis investigations ranges from about $3,034 
for a small facility to $9,619 for larger facilities.   
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Prior to implementation of the new protocol, only outbreaks were 
environmentally investigated, of which there were 7 over a 12 year period.  Since the 
new protocol was established, 17 environmental investigations were conducted in a 
year and a half.  Of the 17 facilities, 6 could be classified as small investigations.  Based 
on these estimates, the cost for SNHD to initiate the new protocol has been 
approximately $124,013 (total cost of 6 small facilities + total cost of 11 large facilities) 
since April 2012, or about $82,675 per year.  Based on these same numbers, over the 
previous 12 years, it can be estimated that SNHD spent approximately $5,611 (7 large 
facilities/12 years) per year on legionellosis investigations.   
 Estimating the cost to facilities is much more challenging.  Initially, the cost to 
the facility is minimal and it is basically comprised of the staff time to accompany SNHD 
staff on the environmental assessment, assist with sampling, and provide building 
schematics.  If the sample results are negative, then that is the end of the cost to the 
facility, but, if the target organism is detected, there is a wide range of costs between 
facilities, with many factors coming into play.  Some factors that can influence the cost 
to a facility are the age of facility, the type and age of the water distribution system, 
whether the facility wants side-by-side sampling (the facility hires an independent 
consultant to take samples at the same time and sites as SNHD) or independent 
oversight, how many sample sites are found to be colonized, and the type of 
remediation chosen.  The sampling costs to the facility can range from $1500 - $5,000 
depending on the analysis method and which laboratory is chosen.  The remediation 
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costs can vary based on how many sample sites were contaminated and which method 
is utilized.  For one zone, the remediation can cost approximately $1,000 to $12,000.  
The least expensive remediation method is hyper chlorination, which is accomplished by 
adding enough chlorine to maintain at least 2ppm for the required 2 hour contact time, 
then flushing the system.  Super heating generally costs more because of the increase in 
power usage to heat the system (Marchesi, 2011).  Some facilities choose to go beyond 
SNHD recommendations, such as draining hot water systems, cleaning tanks and then 
flushing with heat, chlorine or both.  These additional precautions substantially increase 
remediation costs.  Some facilities also opt for side-by-side testing.  When SNHD takes a 
sample, the facility hires their own consultants to take a sample at the same time and 
location.  Other facilities opt for independent oversight with water management 
companies, which charge up to $5,000 for a consultant to be onsite without any testing.  
Generally, only the larger corporations will choose this option.  When a hotel or 
apartment building has to close rooms it can quickly increase the cost due to lost 
revenue.  One facility chose to keep an entire block of rooms closed while test results 
were pending.  This facility had the highest cost of all facilities that required 
remediation, totaling an estimated $1 -2 million.  They chose to go beyond the 
recommendations of SNHD, but they are also part of a multi-national conglomerate with 
financial means that most other facilities do not have.   
To estimate the general cost to facilities found to be sources, at the low end of 
the range it could be approximately $1000 for initial remediation and about $15,000 for 
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the post-remediation sampling with 9 monitoring phase samples tested.  So, a small 
facility doing the minimum requirements would have a minimum cost of about $16,000 
(this estimate does not include any staff time).  For a larger facility, the costs would be 
much higher and include approximately $12,000 for remediation and about $50,000 for 
the post-remediation sampling with 9 monitoring phase samples tested.  For a large 
facility doing the minimum requirements from SNHD, the cost would be approximately 
$62,000.  Larger facilities generally choose the most cautious approach, which can 
quickly increase their costs.   
Of the facilities found to have been a source for the target organism, only two 
would be considered small facilities and eight would be considered large facilities.  A 
rough estimate of the total cost to all “source” facilities since the implementation of the 
new protocol is approximately $1,466,000.  That number includes $16,000 times two for 
the small facilities, $62,000 for each of the seven larger facilities, and an estimate of $1 
million for the large facility that chose to take many extra precautions.  This number is 
an approximation and in all likelihood an underestimate of the total cost to facilities that 
were found to be sources, especially since no facility staff time is included.   The 
approximate total cost to SNHD and the ten facilities since the implementation of the 
new protocol is about $1,590,013. 
 Objective 3: Comparison with other health departments 
 After reaching out to multiple contacts at various levels of the national 
surveillance system, from the federal level (CDC) down to individual local health 
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departments, no data were found that any other agencies conduct such proactive 
legionellosis investigations.  All local agencies that were consulted have similar protocols 
to SNHD’s previous protocol, where an environmental investigation is only conducted 
after a second case association is found.   
Discussion 
 Objective 1: Comparison of remediation methods 
Out of 45 legionellosis case investigations (since April 2012), there were 17 
environmental investigations conducted with 8 sources of the target organism found.  In 
the data set, 2 additional facilities were included that were investigated as outbreaks 
just prior to April of 2012, but both went through the same environmental investigation, 
remediation and monitoring schedule as stated in the new protocol.  So, with only 10 
facilities to compare remediation methods, it is difficult to determine the significance of 
the results, especially the hot water flush, because only one facility chose that method.   
Upon reviewing the post remediation results for the 10 facilities found to be 
sources, it was found that SNHD failed to follow up and complete the monitoring phase 
for four facilities.  One facility went through the remediation process and initial post 
remediation results, but was never entered into the monitoring phase so no additional 
sampling results were completed.  Two facilities did not complete all 9 required post 
remediation monitoring samples, one completed 7 post remediation monitoring 
samples and the other facility only completed 3.  There are no plans to follow up and 
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require these facilities to complete the monitoring phase.  Four facilities are currently in 
the monitoring phase and have results pending. 
When comparing the effectiveness of the remediation methods, a review of 
other studies indicate that each of the methods can be effective in the short term, but 
re-colonization occurs relatively quickly.  That is one of the reasons SNHD monitors for a 
14-month period, to ensure that the target organism does not re-colonize the facility.  In 
one study of apartment buildings, it was found that after utilizing the heat flushing 
method, the concentration of Legionella spp. was below the detection limit, but re-
colonization occurred within a few months (Zacheus, 1996).    Because we only had one 
facility choose the hot water flush only method, it is difficult to make any conclusive 
statements, but that facility did maintain a negative baseline status throughout the 14 
month long monitoring process.  Another study done at an Italian hospital 
demonstrated that negative results after the hot water flush and hyper chlorination 
methods were only temporary and Legionella spp. was detected shortly after 
remediation procedures were deemed effective (Marchesi, 2011).  Another study done 
on the effectiveness of hot water flushing in hotels, hospitals and athletic venues also 
demonstrated that it was not effective unless repeatedly done in combination with 
chlorine disinfection of faucets (Mouchtouri, 2007).  Another study done in hospitals 
found that heat flushing in combination with continuous supplemental chlorination of 
the hot water system was effective long term in the elimination of Legionella (Snyder, 
1990).  One of the factors that may be contributing to the re-colonization is the types of 
 33 
 
microbes, amoeba and/or biofilms that may be in the water systems.  These organisms 
can have a profound effect on the efficacy of a hot water or chlorine flush.  Legionella 
that are associated with biofilms and amoeba are far more resistant to chlorine and 
heat and both need to be applied in higher doses and/or for longer exposure times in 
order to be effective (Green, 1993; Muraca, 1987, Kilvington, 1990).  This could partially 
explain the differences between effective results over 14 months locally versus other 
studies that show re-colonization after only a few months.  
The lack of continuity on SNHD’s part to ensure that all facilities found to be 
sources were followed through the monitoring phase is a problem that was identified in 
this study.  The facilities that SNHD failed to follow were some of the first to be 
investigated under the new protocol, so the practice had yet to be established and there 
was no established procedure on how best to follow up with the facilities.  Since the 
beginning of 2013, and particularly since this evaluation discovered the gaps on the part 
of SNHD, a concerted effort has been made to ensure stringent follow up with all 
facilities is conducted and the monitoring schedule is completed.   
Objective 1: Limitations 
 Some validity issues that could have affected the outcome were differences in 
laboratories performing the testing and different test methods utilized to detect the 
target organism.  The initial sampling is done by SNHD through EMSL Analytical using 
the culture method for Legionella spp.  All post remediation testing is done by a third 
party laboratory, chosen by the facility.  The facility can also choose which type of 
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testing is ordered, i.e. PCR, culture, etc.  The only requirement from SNHD is that the 
laboratory is ELITE certified, meaning the CDC has certified them as proficient in their 
ability to isolate Legionella from water samples.   
Another limitation for this study is the small sample size.  The sample size is 
dependent on how many legionellosis case investigations were conducted since the 
implementation of the new protocol.  Of those investigations, how many resulted in 
environmental investigations, and out of the environmental investigations, how many 
sources were found.   
Objective 2: Cost benefit analysis 
One important component of the cost to facilities is their staff time to complete 
remediation and conduct all the follow up sampling.  The results of the cost benefit 
analysis for facilities described above, do not include any facility staff time.  I was unable 
to obtain any estimate related to local facilities, but a study done that monitored heat 
flushing of hospitals found the cost to be $31,000 in staff time over a period of one 
month (Marchesi, 2011). 
Some of the costs to facilities that are difficult to quantify are litigation and 
negative publicity associated with outbreaks.  Settlement reports are rare because most 
stipulate a non-disclosure agreement, but reportedly awards range from $255,000 to 
hundreds of millions (Smith, 2013).  In 2006, a jury awarded a cruise line $193 million 
dollars against the manufacturer of equipment because the equipment was found to be 
implicated in several Legionnaires’ disease cases.  The largest portion of this award was 
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due to interruption of services and lost bookings (Smith, 2013).  In January of 2012, an 
article published by the Las Vegas Review Journal stated that, in 2011, eight guests sued 
MGM Resorts seeking $337.5 million dollars in damages because they were allegedly 
part of well publicized Legionnaires’ disease outbreaks associated with Aria and Luxor 
earlier that year (Harasim, 2012).  At printing time of the article, the lawsuit was still 
pending and the final outcome is unknown at this time. 
 A study conducted in London on the public health and economic costs of 
Legionnaires’ disease found that the overall cost of one outbreak investigation was 
$729,096 (Lock, 2008).  They also found that only 14% of that total was spent on 
investigation and control of the outbreak vs. 86% on hospital treatment of the cases.  
This study indicates that the time and money spent on public health prevention are a 
good value considering the potential cost of an outbreak (Lock, 2008).     
 According to the CDC, the cost of healthcare for Legionnaires’ disease is 
approximately $101-321 million dollars a year in the U.S. (Collier, 2012).    On average, 
individual hospitalized cases cost more than $34,000 each (Collier, 2012).  According to 
a study presented at the CSTE (Council for State and Territorial Epidemiologists) 
conference in 2013, the average length of stay for a person hospitalized with 
Legionnaires’ disease is 7.5 days to 25.1 days when analyzed from the category of 
lowest to highest severity, with cost per stay ranging from $13,053 – $71,318, 
respectively (Giambrone, 2013).  The conclusion of the CSTE study was that 
Legionnaires’ disease carries a significant economic cost, and with incidence increasing 
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yearly, that number is only expected to rise.  The group who presented the study 
recommended more focus on preventing the illness in vulnerable populations as a cost 
saving measure (Giambrone, 2013).  Also, according to the CDC, modest investments in 
disease prevention can yield significant healthcare cost savings (Collier, 2012).   When 
comparing the approximate cost to SNHD and the local resort industry ($1.6 million over 
a year and a half) vs. the potential costs of another outbreak (approximately $700k, plus 
the potential of hundreds of millions in litigation costs); the information shows that the 
new proactive approach to investigations is worth the extra investment (Lock, 2008).    
A consultant for a multi-national water management company who has worked 
all over the U.S. for the last 20 years and who works closely with several large resort 
properties in Las Vegas was interviewed for his knowledge and experience regarding 
SNHD’s approach to legionellosis investigations (B. Winters, personal communication, 
October 15, 2013).  According to him, SNHD’s approach is very reasonable when it 
comes to the monetary burden that is put on the resort industry to protect the public.  
He also believes that the benefit vs. cost for this protocol is very favorable; by 
conducting thorough assessments after every case, the cost is minimal compared with 
the benefit of avoiding an outbreak.   
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CHAPTER 5 
SIGNIFICANCE AND CONCLUSION 
Significance 
We have seen promising indications that the new protocol is preventing 
outbreaks because there have been no additional cases associated with a facility that 
has undergone an environmental investigation.  Looking at facilities associated with 
outbreaks in the past, if we would have conducted an environmental investigation after 
the first case was found, we could have potentially prevented at least 24 cases of 
Legionnaires’ disease if all the remediation and monitoring phases were successful.  
Applying the average hospitalization cost per case of Legionnaires’ disease of $34,000, 
those 24 cases cost approximately $816,000 in healthcare alone.  That number does not 
include the additional costs of death and litigation associated with outbreaks.  This 
information suggests that the new protocol is cost effective and should be considered a 
successful public health prevention tool.   
Another significant aspect to this protocol is the number of sources of L. 
pneumophila that have been identified that would have been ongoing sources of 
exposure to the public had SNHD continued operating under the former protocol.  This 
evaluation found that approximately 38% of all legionellosis case investigations result in 
an environmental investigation and 59% of those environmental investigations found 
sources of the target organism.  Based on those numbers, about 22% of all cases have 
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been linked to sources of the target organism (Table 3).  If that percentage is applied to 
past investigations, an estimate can be made regarding how many sources were missed 
that could have been the cause of undiagnosed illnesses (Table 4).  For example, 
between January 2008 and March 2012 there were a total of 70 Legionnaires’ disease 
case investigations.  By applying the estimated percentage of sources identified (22%), 
potentially there were 15 sources that were never identified and that could have caused 
many cases of undiagnosed illness in the public.   
 
Table 3. Investigation summary, April 2012 – October 2013   
Summary 
information 
Percentage from 
total 
Total legionellosis 
investigations 
45 
Environmental 
investigations 
initiated from cases 
17/45 (38%) 
Required remedial 
action 
10/45 (22%) 
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Table 4. Investigation summary, January 2008 - March 2012 
Summary 
information 
Percentage from 
total 
Total legionellosis 
investigations 
70 
Environmental 
investigations that 
would have been 
initiated from cases 
25/70 (36%) 
Percentage of 
potential sources 
15/70 (22%) 
 
 
Because no other health departments that were contacted are conducting this 
type of proactive approach to legionellosis investigations, SNHD has the opportunity to 
share this innovative protocol with other health departments who are interested in 
improving their own protocols.  Already, several agencies have reached out for SNHD’s 
assistance in adapting and implementing the protocol to their jurisdictions.  SNHD has 
also been asked to present the new protocol at several environmental health 
conferences to share the experience of adopting the new practice, obtaining buy-in 
from the resort industry, and the results that have been obtained.  This evaluation is an 
important component of sharing the protocol with others because SNHD can show what 
has worked well and what mistakes to avoid when adopting it.   
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Conclusion 
By reviewing investigations done according to the new protocol, the 
effectiveness of the more proactive approach was assessed and evaluated.  While the 
sample size is limited, the data does support that the remediation methods utilized by 
facilities are effective at protecting the health of the public by eliminating ongoing 
sources of L. pneumophila serogroup 1.  Despite not all facilities completing the 
monitoring phase, each one was found to be negative for the target organism during 
post remediation testing.  Even the facility that was unable to eradicate the organism 
from the water system closed the affected building, so while remediation efforts were 
unsuccessful, the protocol itself was successful in that it identified an ongoing threat to 
the public and allowed SNHD to take action to eliminate it. 
Since implementation of the new protocol there have been no secondary cases 
or outbreaks associated with a facility that has undergone an environmental 
investigation.  This was the primary goal of the new protocol and it seems to be 
successful so far.  One recommendation for SNHD is to continue to monitor all 
legionellosis cases and remediated facilities for additional cases and/or outbreaks to 
more conclusively determine that the new protocol is effective at protecting the health 
of the public.  Another recommendation for SNHD is to develop a mechanism for 
monitoring facilities that have been identified as sources to ensure that the remediation 
and monitoring schedules are followed and completed.  Facilities themselves can also be 
more proactive in avoiding colonization with Legionella spp. by following guidelines as 
 41 
 
reported in the proposed ASHRAE New Standard 188 (ASHRAE, 2011).  These 
recommendations provide best practice standards for the prevention of legionellosis 
associated with building water systems.  Because Legionella bacteria are so abundant 
and ubiquitous in the environment, proactive measures are essential to preventing the 
colonization and transmission of illness within the community.  To reduce the incidence 
of illness, it is important for both SNHD and local facilities to engage in a proactive 
partnership and this new protocol has initiated an important first step in that ongoing 
process.   
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Appendix 1 
Southern Nevada Health District (SNHD) Office of 
Epidemiology (OOE) Protocol for Joint 
OOE/Environmental Health (EH) Legionella investigations 
SNHD OOE will investigate every report of Legionellosis. 
Upon notification of a case, the OOE Disease Investigation and Intervention Specialist (DIIS) will 
investigate to confirm the case status and determine if there was an exposure to any public 
facility that falls within SNHD’s jurisdiction.  These include public accommodations or public 
bathing places regulated by SNHD Environmental Health (EH).   
If a case had one or more potential Legionella exposures in the two to fifteen days before 
symptom onset, the DIIS will inform the Special Program EH Supervisor of the exposure(s) 
providing specific details to clearly identify a location:  
o For each public accommodation exposure: 
 Name and address of the facility 
 Room number and/or floor number  
 Dates of exposure 
 Specific amenities used in a public accommodation that may be considered 
an exposure (i.e. – wet bar, in-room whirlpool bath, shower, spa, pool, hot 
tub, misters, etc.) 
o For each public pool, spa or water feature exposure: 
 Name and address of the facility  
 Specific details to identify which pool spa or water feature the case-patient 
was exposed to if a facility has more than one  
 The condition of the pool, spa or water feature (cloudy, green, etc) 
 Anything abnormal about the pool, spa or water feature (strong smell of 
chlorine, temperature, slimy steps, etc.) 
 
Once one or more exposures have been established, the DIIS will enter the information into 
the electronic surveillance system and review it for any other cases with the same 
exposure(s) in the past two years. If a cluster* or outbreak* is identified, an Epi-X posting 
will be drafted and submitted by the OOE. 
 
Upon notification of exposure details, EH will conduct an investigation into the potential 
exposure at the permitted facility using its protocols for investigating Legionellosis.    A DIIS 
will accompany EH staff to the facility to verify the case’s dates of stay and room number 
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within the facility’s registration system.  If the EH investigation provides evidence of 
Legionella contamination an outbreak may be declared and public notifications may be 
deemed necessary by SNHD. 
 
Case classification: 
 
Single case:   Case associated with a permitted facility that has not been linked with any other 
cases of Legionnaires’ disease for at least the previous two years. 
 
Cluster:  Two or more cases associated with the same permitted facility where the patients’ 
symptom onset occurred within the same two-year period. 
 
Outbreak:  Two or more cases associated with the same permitted facility where the patients’ 
symptom onset occurred within the same two-year period and where environmental 
investigations provide additional evidence suggesting a common source of infection. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*Final version 8/8/12 
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Appendix 2 
 
 
 
Environmental Health Division 
Policy 
 
1. PURPOSE 
 
Southern Nevada Health District (SNHD) Environmental Health (EH) Division (EHD) staff may 
be called upon to conduct an environmental investigation of a facility that has been 
associated with a confirmed or suspected case or cases of legionellosis.  The purpose of this 
policy is to provide guidance regarding the EHD’s environmental investigation of systems or 
locations where Legionella spp. bacteria may be present. 
2. POLICY 
 
2.1 Initiate environmental investigation response protocol 
 
2.1.1 SNHD EHD shall respond to every reported case of legionellosis, including sporadic 
cases. 
 
2.1.2 Upon receipt of notification from the OOE regarding an alleged or confirmed case of 
legionellosis at a southern Nevada location, the Special Programs EH Supervisor will 
advise the public accommodation facility EH Supervisor and Legionella Response Team 
members that an upcoming response, including an environmental assessment and 
sampling, is being planned. 
 
2.1.3 EH will schedule the site visit with the facility as soon as practical from the OOE-to-EH 
notification.  The facility environmental assessment and sampling will not be scheduled 
for or occur on a Friday. 
 
2.1.4 When necessary and sufficient information has been made available to clearly identify 
the area of concern, the Special Programs EH Supervisor will advise the affected facility 
to schedule the environmental assessment and sampling to occur on its property.  The 
appointment shall be made so that there is at least 24 hours, but no more than 48 
hours, between the contact time for the official notification and the scheduled site visit.  
 45 
 
The site visit on the day selected for the appointment should preferably be held first 
thing in the morning. 
 
2.1.5 The CDC form, “Environmental Assessment of Water Systems,” will be sent to the facility 
representative via e-mail after the meeting date and time is scheduled so that the 
facility may gather the pertinent information and complete the form prior to the 
meeting. 
 
2.2 Respirator-related requirements during the environmental assessment 
 
2.2.1 During an environmental investigation of a facility associated with a confirmed or 
suspected case or cases of legionellosis, there is a possibility that those SNHD Legionella 
Investigation Team members who conduct the environmental assessment and collect 
samples during the investigation may be exposed to Legionella pneumophila (Lp), the 
pathogen that causes Legionnaires’ disease and Pontiac fever, or other pathogenic 
forms of Legionella spp. 
 
2.2.2 SNHD EH staff must comply with all of the requirements of the most current SNHD RPP 
and the EH Policy #EH-14 prior to utilizing any type of respirator as part of their assigned 
Legionella Response Team duties. 
 
2.2.3 EH staff must don respirators in all areas associated with increased risk of Legionella 
exposure.  The facility may choose instead to reduce or eliminate the risk by turning off 
aerosol generating water features (i.e. water fountains, spas), if donning an appropriate 
respirator is not an option. 
 
2.3 Environmental investigation-facility preparatory meeting 
 
The SNHD Legionella Investigation Team, including possible OOE representatives, will 
meet with facility representatives at the scheduled site visit to: 
 
2.3.1 Deliver official notification from OOE validating guest stay with a letter of initial report 
of case of Legionellosis, including formal request to access affected room(s). 
 
2.3.2 Discuss Legionella ecology, sources, and pathogenicity. 
 
2.3.3 Report cases, including how the case was identified to the SNHD. 
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2.3.4 Obtain room number from the facility by an OOE representative, if necessary. 
 
2.3.5 Request following records from the first of the month that is at least 60 days prior to 
case stay to present (date of site visit): 
2.3.5.1 Water management plan. 
2.3.5.2 Recent Legionella sampling results. 
2.3.5.3 Schematic of the plumbing system of the facility. 
2.3.5.4 Pool/Spa records. 
2.3.5.5 Cooling tower maintenance logs. 
2.3.5.6 Hot water maintenance logs. 
2.3.5.7 Water mister maintenance logs. 
 
2.3.6 Require the facility to provide reasonable access to affected room(s), as per SNHD 
Regulations Governing the Sanitation and Safety of Public Accommodation Facilities, 
Section 11, and any associated areas impacting the affected room(s) and their water 
systems. 
 
2.3.7 Schedule the investigation and associated sampling events, including: 
2.3.7.1 A comprehensive environmental assessment. 
2.3.7.2 Sampling events, as many as are necessary to determine source of Legionella and 
document remediation activities. 
2.3.7.3 A walk of the affected property to identify potential sources of exposure to Legionella. 
 
2.4 Environmental assessment-general instructions 
 
The SNHD Legionella Investigation Team shall: 
 
2.4.1 Use CDC form, “Environmental Assessment of Water Systems,” to complete an 
environmental assessment at the affected facility.  The form is available electronically to 
EH staff. 
2.4.1.1 As per instructions printed on the form, to not leave any sections of the form blank. 
2.4.1.2 If the section does not apply, mark it as “non applicable.” 
 
2.4.2 Interview any facility staff who may have knowledge of the case(s) or water systems 
within the facility. 
 
2.4.3 Collect as much information as possible.  Utilize the CDC form as a guideline to ascertain 
all relevant information.  Any blank information not readily available during the initial 
investigation can be filled out by facility staff and submitted to SNHD within a timeframe 
determined by SNHD. 
 
2.5 Environmental assessment-walk-through of property looking at specific areas 
 
 47 
 
The SNHD Legionella Investigation Team shall look at specific areas and document the 
conditions found within the facility which are the most likely to be the sources of 
Legionella within the facility, such as: 
 
2.5.1 Cooling towers. 
 
2.5.2 Public bathing places (SNHD-permitted bodies of water), spas, and swimming pools. 
2.5.2.1 Check sanitizer levels, pH, TA and cyanuric acid levels. 
2.5.2.2 Check temperature. 
2.5.2.3 Complete pages 7 and 8 of 13 on the Environmental Assessment Form. 
2.5.2.4 If any condition is noted that necessitates closure of the body of water, the body of 
water will be closed.  If any body of water is closed, then the routine assigned EHS 
shall be notified. 
 
2.5.3 Fountains 
2.5.3.1 Check sanitizer levels. 
 
2.5.4 Water misters. 
 
2.5.5 Hot water heaters. 
 
2.6 Environmental assessment-water sampling 
 
The SNHD Legionella Investigation Team shall select and complete water sampling within 
identified areas, as follows: 
 
2.6.1 Room selection will be based on where guest stayed. 
 
2.6.2 Samples will be taken from all sinks, bathtubs, showers, or similar fixtures in the room. 
2.6.2.1 Any easily accessible thermostatic cold mixing valve on hot water systems that can be 
accessed without the use of tools will be turned off. 
 
2.6.3 Samples shall be taken from the room where the guest stayed. 
 
2.6.4 Samples shall be taken from the distal room on the riser where the case stayed. 
 
2.6.5 If possible, a sample shall be taken from the return of the hot water loop of the riser 
where the case stayed. 
 
2.6.6 Samples from locations specified in Section 5.6.2, in guest rooms will include: 
2.6.6.1 A sample of cold water will be taken on first draw. 
2.6.6.2 A sample of cold water will be taken after a 1 minute flush. 
2.6.6.3 A sample of hot water will be taken on first draw. 
2.6.6.4 A sample of hot water will be taken after a 1 minute flush. 
2.6.6.5 An environmental swab of each fixture and the corresponding aerator will be taken. 
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2.6.7 Complete data on page 7 of 13 on the Environmental Assessment Form.  Log times 
samples were collected. 
 
2.6.8 Bulk water samples taken shall be one (1) liter. 
 
2.6.9 If the facility requests split sampling, then the facility will bear the SNHD handling costs 
that include: 
2.6.9.1 Purchase of supplies including, but not limited to, the two (2)-liter sample bottles, 
2.6.9.2 Sample processing expenses, and  
2.6.9.3 The manpower to assist in conducting such sampling. 
 
2.6.10 SNHD will collect a two (2) liter sample in a sterile bottle, then decant one (1) liter of 
aliquot into the SNHD one (1) liter sample container.  SNHD will then decant the 
remaining aliquot into the third-party sample container. 
 
2.6.11 Samples will be packed in insulated containers with frozen cold packs. 
 
2.6.12 Samples will be shipped to a CDC ELITE certified laboratory. 
 
2.7 Results of water samples and environmental specimens 
 
The SNHD Legionella Investigation Team shall direct the following actions to occur, based 
on the laboratory results: 
 
2.7.1 If a bulk water sample from any guest room fixture has a result of greater than 10 
cfu/ml of the target organism in any location, then the riser will be remediated. 
 
2.7.2 If samples from two or more different fixtures have a result of less than 10cfu/ml, but 
do not report as a non-detect of the target organism, then remediation will be required 
for that riser in the facility. 
 
2.7.3 If environmental swabs indicate the presence of the target organism in more than one 
fixture, then the riser will be remediated. 
 
2.7.4 If any water sample or environmental swab returns with results less than 10 cfu/ml, but 
is the target organism for the specimen used to diagnose the case individual, then the 
SNHD shall determine what type of remediation is required. 
 
2.7.5 Environmental samples collected from areas that are not guest room fixtures must meet 
the OSHA standards.  If the samples do not meet OSHA standards, then remediation of 
the system will be required. 
 
2.7.6 SNHD will review recent facility history to determine if the actions indicated above are 
appropriate for the facility or if other actions are needed. 
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2.7.7 If a whole riser remediation is not required by the results of Sections 5.7.1 to 5.7.5, then 
SNHD will instruct the facility to remediate the system in a manner specified by their 
consultant.  SNHD will not supervise this remediation, but will require follow-up 
sampling of the fixture in the same manner as the initial positive sample. 
 
2.7.8 The following requirements are from the OSHA standard for Legionella control: 
2.7.8.1 Domestic water=10 cfu/ml or less, 
2.7.8.2 Misting water systems=1 cfu/ml or less, 
2.7.8.3 Cooling tower water=100 cfu/ml or less. 
 
2.8 Remediation 
 
2.8.1 The sampling results and environmental findings must be reported to the facility in the 
form of a formal letter.  At this time, the facility management shall be notified of 
additional required sampling within the facility. 
 
2.8.2 Remaining risers/buildings in the facility shall be tested using one (1) percent of all 
rooms served by that riser/hot water tank. 
 
2.8.3 The facility shall submit plans of remediation to SNHD for review and approval. 
 
2.8.4 After review, SNHD will approve or deny the remediation plans and will communicate its 
decision to the facility operator.  All remediation work will be completed by facility staff 
and/or consultants and will be supervised by SNHD. 
 
2.8.5 SNHD shall directly supervise all on-site remediation activities. 
 
2.8.6 SNHD shall determine the timeframe in which remediation activities will be conducted. 
 
2.8.7 The facility shall coordinate remediation with SNHD. 
 
2.8.8 Remediation shall be conducted according to best industry practices outlined in ASHRAE 
Guideline 12-2000. 
 
2.8.9 All fixtures, including service and janitorial sinks, are to be checked by facility staff to 
ensure proper chlorine and temperature levels are met, as determined by the facility’s 
consultant. 
 
2.8.10 SNHD shall verify that all facility staff members are conducting remediation activities as 
specified. 
 
2.8.11 The facility is responsible for all costs, including SNHD staff time, for resulting 
remediation activities. 
 
2.9 Post-Remediation Follow-up Sampling 
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2.9.1 After conclusion of remediation, follow-up sampling will occur using the facility’s 
selected CDC ELITE certified laboratory. 
 
2.9.2 One (1) percent of all rooms, along with the distal room, served by the riser that was 
remediated shall be randomly selected and tested. 
 
2.9.3 All fixtures on the remediated water system line(s), post-flush, within the randomly-
selected room shall be sampled. 
 
2.9.4 All sample results shall be submitted to SNHD. 
 
2.9.5 Any additional remediation shall be determined by SNHD using the protocols outlined 
above in this document. 
 
2.10 Post Investigation Monitoring Schedule 
 
2.10.1 One (1) percent of randomly-sampled and distal rooms in the remediated riser of the 
facility shall be tested on the following schedule: 
2.10.1.1 Bi-weekly for three sampling periods (6 weeks). 
2.10.1.2 Monthly for three months. 
2.10.1.3 Quarterly for three quarters. 
 
2.10.2 Room numbers and sample locations shall be provided to SNHD 48 hours (2 business 
days) prior to sampling. 
 
2.10.3 Sample results shall be provided to SNHD and analyzed by SNHD using the protocols 
outlined above in this document. 
 
2.10.4 Any additional remediation required will reset the monitoring schedule back to day 
one. 
 
 
*Final version 8/30/12 
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